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[F]or those with a sense of urban history, the tragedy of New Orleans is
... about a lost opportunity [for the welfare of the city's inhabitants].
All of the g reat challenges that confront the 21st-century city ... are
crystallized in New Orleans.'

I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article chronicles the perplexing asymmetry between New
Orleans' devastation by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and the state's
subsequent adoption of constitutional amendments2 that threaten to
cripple the eminent domain power as a pillar of New Orleans' post
hurricane recovery.

I.

Nicolai Ouroussoff, Reflections: New Orleans and China,

2008 (Week in Review), at 1 .
2.

2006 La. Acts 851 (amending LA.

CONST .

art .

N.Y. TIMES,

Sept. 14,

I, § 4(B)); 2006 La. Acts 859

(adding LA. CONST. art. I, § 4(H)). Because there was a third constitutional resolution, 2006
La. Acts 853 (amendi n g LA. CONST. art. I, § 4(G)), the section originally designated 4(G) by
Acts 859 was redesignated 4(H).
Appendix.

For the complete text of artic le I, section 4, see infra
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How did this divergence occur? What does it tell us about

City of New London,3

Keio v.

the United States Supreme Court decision to

which the amendments are a response, about libertarian objections to
the eminent domain power, and about the adequacy of redevelopment
discourse as cities shift from an earlier era's focus on large-scale slum
clearance to more modest and diversely targeted current goals?
The drama is national as well as local.

Elements found in

Louisiana's amendments were proposed by property rights groups and
adopted elsewhere in a number of other states.

Keio is

conventionally portrayed as holding that the transfer to a

private party of unblighted expropriated property in aid of New
London's "economic development" satisfies the federal constitution's
"public use" requirement. Oral argument before the Supreme Court
defined "economic development" more precisely, however, as a
process enabling government to

favor one property

transferee) over another (the condemnee)

solely because

owner (the
the use to

which the former proposes to put the property promises the city a
greater tax y i eld.4

Keio
Parker,5 the

Conventional analysis also b ottoms its assessment of the
outcome on whether or not it comports with

Bennan

v.

Court's leading eminent domain/urban renewal precedent. In doing so,
however, it pursues a false scent b ecause the two cases are misaligned

in

their facts and in their legal issues.

Superficially, they appear

factually similar because in neither instance were the litigated parcels
blighted. Unlike

Keio, however, Bennan featured a

conventional slum

redevelopment scenario that posed the narrow and, in retrospect,
relatively uninteresting question o f whether an unblighted property

3.
4.

545 U.S. 469 (2005).
This refinement occurred during the follqwing exchange involving Justices Scalia

and O'Connor a n d City of New London Attorney Wesley Horton:
JUSTICE SCALIA: I just want to take property from people who are paying less
taxes and give it to people who are paying more taxes. That would be a public use,
wouldn't it?
JUSTICE O'CONNOR: For example, Motel 6 and the city thinks, well, if we had
a Ritz-Carl ton, we would have higher taxes. Now, is that okay?
MR. HORTON: Yes, Your Honor. That would be okay.

342 LANDMARK BRlEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNlTED STATES:
CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW 2004 TERM SUPPLEMENT 722 (Gerhard Casper & Kathleen M. Sullivan
eds., 2005).
5.

348 U.S. 26 (1954) .
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located in a sea o f blighted properties may be expropriated along with
them.6
The legal issues differed as well.

In Berman, the question posed

and affirmatively answered is whether a "public use" is ser ved by
eminent

domain-based
urban

substantive

redevelopment

planning

undertaken

problem-here

slum

to

remedy

creation

a
and

clearance-when one of the properties taken was not itself blighted.
But in Keio, the majority and concurring opinions, like the litigants
themselves,

untethered

the

power's

deploy ment

from

blight

remediation or any other substantive planning concern, asking instead
whether or not government's assessment of its fiscal needs alone
warrants denying a private property owner the autonomy over property
that, in its current use, is other wise unproblematic.

Under this

misguided perspective, eminent domain-based redevelopment is freed
from the discipline demanded by a sound linkage to the resolution of
substantive planning problems, and is transformed, in effect, into an
auxiliary of the taxing power.
This disconnect triggered Justice O'Connor's riposte-previewed
in her questio ning during oral argument-that, following

Keio,

"[n]othing is to prevent the State from replacing any Motel 6 with a
Ritz-Carlton, any home with a shopping mall, or any farm with a
factory."1

Had New London linked its use of eminent domain to a

The inclusion of relatively few properties that do not share the characteristic
6.
features of most of the properties within a district established upon the basis of the latter's
features is commonplace in American land use planning. Illustrative are properties that do
not share the historic or architectural features defining most of an historic district's structures.
The former, however, are no less subject to the design regulations than the latter because the
regulations address what the Louisiana courts have termed the "tout ensemble" of the
district's urban tissue. See City ofNew Orleans v. Levy, 64 So. 2d 798, 801-02 (La. 1953);
Maher v. City ofNew Orleans, 222 So. 2d 608, 614 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1969). Similarly, many
states expressly authorize localities to include nonblighted properties within larger
redevelopment districts of mostly blighted properties when doing so is necessary or
appropriate to secure the districts' planned redevelopment goals. See, e.g., Omo REv. CODE
ANN . § l .08(A) (LexisNexis Supp. 2008) (providing that nonblighted structures may be taken
if seventy percent of area's parcel's are blighted); 26 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 205(c)(i) (West
Supp. 2008) (providing that nonblighted structures may be taken if majority of area's
structures are blighted or represent a majority of the area).
545 U.S. at 503 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In addition to inciting the assault on
7.
"economic developmenf' found in virtually all post-Keio measures, Justice O'Connor's
distress over the Court's elimination of substantive planning concerns is widely shared by
commentators, e.g., Ilya Somin, Controlling the Grasping Hand· Economic Development
TakingsAfierKelo, 15 SUP. Cr. ECON. REv. 183, 191 (2007) ("[T]his rationale can be used to
condemn virtually any property for transfer to a private commercial enterprise."), and by
judges, including those writing prior to the Keio decision, e.g., County of Wayne v. Hathcock,
684 N.W2d 765, 786 (Mich. 2004) ("[The] 'economic benefit' rationale would validate
practically any exercise of the power of eminent domain on behalf of a private entity.").
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substantive

planning concem,8

she

would have

399

approved both

expropriation and the private-to-private transfer following it.9
The Keio majority invited states troubled by its action to address
the issue as a matter of state law.10 Nothing less than a national land
use seminar· followed in which virtually every state legislature visited
the question, and at least forty-two enacted post-Keio measures of one
kind or another.11
Louisiana's constitutional provision is one of these measures. It
was adopte d twenty-four months after the Keio d ecision, which
preceded Hurricanes Katrina and Rita by only two months. Part IT of
this Article utilizes the storms' devastation and the City of New
Orleans' recovery program to document the essential role assigned to
eminent domain in the latter.
Part III moves from New Orleans to the national stage to review
the states' various post-Keio approaches. It highlights a pattern, the
"anti-Keio format," which tightens the eminent domain power's ambit
well beyond the limits proposed b y Justice O'Connor.

Louisiana's

constitutional amendments can plausibly be claimed to align with this
approach. An assessment of the format's structure, moreover, reveals
its inadequacies when measured against the public need created by the
nation's largest natural disaster as well as by the less dramatic if
equally necessary regular requirements of urban systems management.
Part IV returns to Louisiana to place the state's post-Keio
measure w ithin the national context. It details why the measure will
shut down eminent domain's use as currently envisaged in New
Orleans' recovery program if Louisiana courts construe the measure

as

an anti-Keio format clone.
Part V offers four conclusions. The first is that Keio erred when
it unlinked eminent domain from the solution of substantive urban
system problems.

This reasoning trivialized the power's redevelop

ment role, needlessly triggered post-Keio outrage, and gave rise to the
fantasy that the matter could be set aright by banning "economic
development" as a "public use," or, in Louisiana's case, as a "public

8.

The concern,

in her view, could not fall short ofan "affirmative

harm." Keio, 545

U.S. at 500 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
9.

Id

10.
I I.

For

Id at

489 (majority opinion).

an

inventory of state post-Keio responses, see CASTLE COAL., 50 STATE

REPORT CARD: TRACKING EMINENT DOMAIN

REFORM LEGISLATION SINCE KELO (2007), http://

www.castlecoalition.org/pdf/publications/report.card/50_State_Report.pdf; Nat'! Conference
of State

Legislatures, Eminent Domain

2007

State Legislation,

programs/n atres/emindomainleg07.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2008).

http://www.ncsl.org/
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This Article advocates reestablishing the linkag e as the

central inquiry posed by the public-use criterion.u
The second is that the anti-Keio format's preference for a closed
ended, pre-twentieth-century definition of the eminent domain power's
scope is driven by considerations that aggressively ignore the public
necessities disclosed by New Orleans' faltering recovery efforts, and,
more broadly, by the urban systems needs of America's cities generally.
The third is that the initial wave of post-Keio measures merely
commences the states' effort to wrestle with Keio. A second wave
awaits in which the courts will serve as co-authors of the many first
wave measures that, lacking authoritative construction, admit to an
array of conflicting interpretations. I anticipate a third wave as well, as
legislatures in other states revise their handiwork to avoid the qualms
and misgivings of the kind now plaguing New Orleans'

stalled

recover y program.
My final observation adopts Justice Brandeis's metaphor that
views each of the post-Keio responses as the work of an individual
state

"laboratory"

engaged

in

"novel

social

and

economic

experiments."14 The coming years will provide an experiential basis for
determining the wisdom and practicability for eminent domain-based
redevelopment of the anti-Keio format as contrasted with more flexible
approaches that are no longer confined simply by the slum and blight
clearance goals of the earlier Bennan era.

II.

KATRINA, RITA, AND THE NEW ORLEANS RECOVERY PROGRAM
Katrina and Rita pinpointed Louisiana and New Orleans as their

Ground Zero.

A

few facts portray the storms' ferocity. Deaths: 1527 .15

90,000 square miles.16 Homes destroyed or made
300,000.11 Estimated economic loss: $125-150 billion.18

Land area damaged:
inhabitable:

12.

For purposes of this Article, Louisiana Constitution article I, section4(B)(l)'s

phrase "public purpose" is interchangeable with the phrase "public use" found in the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.
13.

It also raises for another day a question of novel impression posed by

but ignored by the Court and litigants:

Kelo's facts
if a

namely whether or not the criterion is satisfied

city condemns property located in a project area in part or in whole to remedy an off-project
planning problem.
14.

See infra note

139 and accompanying text.

New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285

dissenting).
15.

DANIEL

U.S.

262, 3 1 1 ( 1932) (Brandeis, J.,

A. FARBER & JIM CHEN, DISASTERS AND THE LAW:

KATRINA AND BEYOND

17 (2006).

lived

16.

id This area is equivalent

17.

Id In New Orleans, 108,731 households-fifty percent of the city's population

in

in size to the area of the United Kingdom.

houses with over four feet of flood water.

BRING NEW

O RLEANS

BACK COMM'N,
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Post-storm 2005 unemployment rate: 12.5%.19 New Orleans' post
storm population loss: roughly two-thirds.20 Estimated cost of
restoring New Orleans' public infrastructure: $14.4 billion.21
The New Orleans M ayor's Office of Recovery Management
(ORM) directs the city's recovery program in an effort that draws
heavily from three prior plans, the most detailed of which is the
Unified New Orleans Plan (UNOP), which received legislative
approval in 2006.22 A necessarily brief review of these complex efforts
illuminates the city's post-Katrina strategies. It also reveals key
components of the urban redevelopment enterprise that American
cities routinely pursue, albeit under less harried circumstances. In
addition to considerations bearing on "economic development" and
private transfers of expropriated property, these components include
government's role as urban system manager, the respective
contributions of government and the private sector in public/private
redevelopment partnerships, and eminent domain's place within this
interaction.
A.

Urban Redevelopment's Multiple Pwposes and Sectors

New Orleans' recovery planning seeks to prevent ''uncoordinated,
dysfunctional redevelopment; an ineffective infrastructure policy; and

PLAN FOR NEW ORLEANS:
THE NEW AMERICAN CIT Y fig.5 (2006),
http://www.npr.org/documents/2006/jan/CityPlanningFinalReport.pdf [hereinafter BNOB
Plan].
18.
FARBER & CHEN, supra note 15, at 17.
19.
Id Short-term, over 203,000 jobs were lost in New Orleans. BNOB Plan, supra
note 17, fig.5.
20.
FARBER & CHEN supra note 15, at 17. The Farber/Chen figures are calculated on
the basis of the approximate ratio of New Orleans ' population in 2000 (485,000) to that
figure in January 2006 (145,000).
21.
NEW ORLEANS CMTY. SUPPORT FOUND. & CMTY. SUPPORT 0RG., THE UNIFIED
NEW ORLEANS PLAN: CITYWIDE STRATEGIC RECOVERY AND REBUILDING PLAN § 6.1.2, tbl.6.1
(2006), http://www.unifiedneworleansplan.com!uploads/UNOP-FI NAL-PLAN-April-200715744.pdf [hereinafter UNOP].
22.
The other plans are the BNOB P lan, supra note 17, and the New Orleans
Neighborhoods Rebuilding Plan (October 2006) (also known as the "Lambert Plan"),
available at http://www.nolanrp.com/Data/Neighborhood//NOLA_NRP_SUMMARY.pdf.
Integrating the proposals of the ULI, Lambert, and UNOP, Edward Blakely, Director of the
Mayor's Office of Recovery Management, announced a seventeen-district recovery program,
the progress of which is available at http://neworleans.iprojweb.com/basedefault.aspx (last
visited Nov. 20, 2008). Approximately $1.1 billion will be committed to restore capital
improvements, streets and streetscapes, and other infrastructure enhancement projects within
the seventeen districts. NORA's expropriation p owers and financial support will be employed
principally in aid of the revitali:zation of these districts.
ACTION

,
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2
a staged ten
... a greatly impaired urban fabric." 3 UNOP projects
price tag.'"
year recovery program with a $14.4 billion estimated
sectors:
UNOP envisag es allocation of the latter sum to ten recovery
housing;
flood protection; infrastr ucture and utilities; transportation;
economic development; healthca re; education; historic preser vation

and urban design; environment; and community services (including
public safety, recreation and library, and municipal and cultural
services).25 Note that only one of the ten sectors is tenned "economic
development," which UNOP identifies a s restoration of the city's ports,
tourist industry, and energy sector, and development of a downtown
medical district. 26

On its face, UNOP conceives urban revitalization as encompassing

a great deal more than "economic development," whether undertaken
to cope with a natural disaster or, more routinely, to improve or stave
off the decline of the city's urban s ystems.

UNOP's community

services component clarifies, moreover, that renewal efforts span
social as well as physical development components.
B.

Urban Redevelopment: The Public Side ofthe Public/Pn·vate
Partnership
New Orleans is also a partner with the pri vate sector. Reserving

discussion of its use of eminent domain for the next section, the city's
contributions to this public/private partnership are basically threefold.
It sets the public agenda through the planning activities described
earlier. It finances and provides the public infrastructure required to
support an efficiently functioning private land market. Finally, it must
insure that its land use regulatory framework correctly tracks the city's
post-Katrina footprint.
Storm-compelled reductions or modifications in the desired
levels and location of the city's pre-Katrina population insure that the
city will not duplicate its pre-Katrina footprint.12 Like the other two

23.

URBAN LAND INST., A STRATEGY FOR REBUILDING NEW ORLEANS NOVEMBER

12-

18,2005, at 11 (draft report Dec. 10,2005), http://lra.louisiana.gov/assets/docs/se a rchab le/
reports/ULI_Draft_New Orleans_Report.pdf.
24.
UNOP,supmnote21,§§ 1.1.3,6.1.1.3.
_

26.

Id §§2.4-2.4.10.
Id §§ 4.5-4.5.5.

27.

The BNOB Plan speaks candidly to the necessity of rearranging the city's land

25.

use, population, and infrastructure footprints:
We must face the fact that there may have to be some consolidation of
neighborhoods that have insufficient population to support the equitable and
efficient delivery of services. . . . We have no choice but to be responsible with use

2008]
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plans, UNOP evaluates the city's planning districts on the basis of their
vulnerability to repeat flooding, and it coordinates the scope, timing,
and capacity levels of new or rebuilt infrastructure w ith policies that
seek to balance the equitable treatment of all city neighborhoods with
a stated preference

for the

"densification" and "clustering" of

development and population in areas of acceptable floo d risk.28

C

Urban Redevelopment· Eminent Domain and the Private Side of
the Public/Private Partnership
UNOP envisages government/private interaction as a symbiotic

relationship. Government defines the development goals, finances
public infrastructure, and provides a supportive regulatory structure.
But it depends upon the private sector to finance and assume the
private market risks of private construction.29

of limited City resources. We must provide public facilities and services where
population is concentrated so these resources can be used in the most equitable and
efficient manner possible.
BNOB Plan, supra note 17, at 12.
As of June 2008, New Orleans had regained only seventy-two percent of its 2005 pre
Katrina population (as measured by the number of households actively receiving mail). See
BROOKINGS INST., THE NEW ORLEANS INDEX, ANNIVERSARY EDITION: THREE YEARS AFrER
KATRINA 8 (2008), http://gnocdc.s3.amazonaws.com/NOLAindex/ESNew0rleanslndexAug

08.pdf. New Orleans' 2000 population of 485,000 was down some 165,00 from a city whose

infrastructure had once served a city of 650,000. See Frank S. Alexander, Land Reform in
the Storms' Aftermath, 53 LOY. L. R.Ev. 727, 731 (2007). Evidence that the city's footprint is

indeed changing appears in statistical updates showing that more than half of all active
residences in New Orleans in June 2008 were located in the four planning districts least
flooded by Katrina as compared with the thirty-nine percent of the city's households that

lived in these districts pre-Katrina. See BROOKINGS INST., supra, at 8. Other planning
districts in January 2008 recorded population levels as low as nineteen percent of their pre
Katrina levels. Id at 18.
28.
UNOP, supra note 21, § 3.3.3 figs.3.4

& 3.5 (creating three "recovery policy

areas" premised on degree of fo
l od risk and likely repopulation rate). UNOP stresses the role
of clustering and densification as agents of topographical shift in its observation that
[a] more clustered pattern of resettlement will help the City and other agencies
focus investments and upgrade public services and infrastructure to attract
residents and businesses to reside near one another. A more clustered pattern of
resettlement will reduce the guesswork among residents and businesses about their
neighborhood's future viability, by restoring communities and reducing blight. It
will also provide a guide to the City and other agencies to use in restoring
infrastructure and services, and targeting investments to enhance infrastructure and
services, and improve quality of life, which can stimulate additional investments.
Id§ 3.3.3.
29.
Marc Mihaly observes that "cities or redevelopment agencies typically cannot
accept market and development risk, and often cannot front high 'predevelopment' expenses,
that is the costs of planners, economists, engineers, and attorneys necessary to work through
the details of the project proposal; and they are ill suited to perform the vertical

TULANE LAW REVIEW

404

[Vol. 83:395

Eminent domain tightens the public/private embrace because
redevelopers, unlike energy or mining companies or

landlocked

property owners, are not traditional delegees of government's eminent
domain power. They must rely instead on government to acquire and
transfer redevelopment parcels to them.
1.

NORA and UNOP's Five Eminent Domain-Based Charges
Under legislation approved one year prior to Katrina, the New

Orleans Redevelopment Authority (NORA) was granted the power to
condemn both individual blighted parcels30 and land assemblages
within entire "community improvement

area[s]."31

NORA may

transfer expropriated property to other private parties in both cases. •c
Blighted areas are defined in the traditional urban renewal/slum
clearance mode,33 while an individual blighted property

must be

adjudicated to warrant that status on the basis of a prior administrative
determination. 34
In view

of this statutory authority, New Orleans

recovery

planning assigns NORA five principal tasks in its role as the city's lead
property acquisition and transfer agency.

The first35 is to serve as a

depositary36 for parcels coming to it principally from the state's Road
Home Program,37 from the city's tax adjudication program,38 and, most
development." Marc B. Mihaly, Public-Pn.vate Redevelopment Partnerships and the Supreme
Court: Keio v. City of New London, mTHE SUPREME COURT AND TAKINGS: FOUR ESSAYS 41,
New Orleans·
58 (2005), available at http://www .vjel.org/books/pdf/PUBS10003.pdf.
dependence on the private sector to implement the city's recovery goals is even more
imperative in view of the sheer nwnber of its post-Katrina blighted parcels (71,000), its need
to obtain program funds to acquire or maintain such properties through the sale of
expropriated parcels to developers, the absence of governmental uses for all but a tiny
fraction of them, and their need to be returned to active private use as a stimulant to
neighborhood revitalization. See infra note 46 and accompany ing text.
30. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33:4720.59 (Supp. 2008).
31. Id§ 33:4720.58(A).
32. Id § 33:4720.59(A)-(B) (individual blighted properties), § 33:4720.60(A)( l )
(properties within community improvement districts).
33. See id § 33:4720.58(A). The provision's language authorizing NORA to
expropriate "any real property . . . which it may deem necessary for or in connection with a
community improvement plan" enables NORA to acquire unblighted parcels, such as that
litigated in Bennan, in a district composed principally of blighted parcels.
34. See id§ 33:4720.59(B).
35. UNOP, supra note 21, § 5.4.4.3.
36. UNOP places this depositary function under NORA's "land banking" authority.
Id
37. The Road Home Corporation (RHC) was established as a nonprofit corporation
to acquire, hold, manage, and convey properties that it acquires from Louisiana homeowners
who opt to sell their homes to it. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:600.63, 40:600.66. RHC's
complex structure and functions are detailed in Alexander, supra note 27, at 735-37, and on

2008]

405

AMERICAN CITIES JN POST-KELO ERA

important,

from

NORA's

own

programs for

the

purchase

or

expropriation of blighted properties, which it anticipates will furnish
most of the properties in its eventual inventory.39 In the early stages of
recovery planning, New Orleans' mayor predicted that NORA would
become the "'depository' for swaths of wrecked residential property.''4°
His prediction was overtaken, however, by the doubts that Louisiana's
pending constitutional amendments would soon pose for the effort.41
NORA's second charge is to work with other city agencies to
coordinate its acquisition-disposition program with their policies and
responsibilities in the recovery effort.42 Its third is to employ eminent
the Louisiana Recovery Authority's Web site located at http:// www.lra.louisiana.gov/. For the
purposes of this Article, RHC is significant because NORA expects to have approximately
5000 RHC properties transferred to it by 2010. Telephone Interview with John J. Marshall,
StaffAttorney, NORA, inNew Orleans, La. (Sept. 17, 2008).
38.

Properties

in

tax arrears may be put up for auction in Louisiana.

See LA. REv.

STAT. ANN. § § 47:2186, 47:2251. If the properties fail to sell, they are transferred to pertinent
parish or municipality. Acquisition of these properties in New Orleans is governed by 1'd.
§ 47:2254. For a discussion of the program, including the serious title issues associated with
tax adjudicated property, see Alexander, supra note 27, at 752-56. NORA has not been a
successful bidder for tax adjudicated properties. Approximately 1500 such properties,
however, have been transferred to NORA by other city agencies. Telephone Interview with
John J. Marshall, supra note 37.
39.

Telephone Interview with John J. Marshall, supm note 37.

40.

Frank Donze, Unlikely Agency Key to Rebirth, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans),

Oct. 11, 2006, a t Al.
4 1.

Frank Alexander acknowledges these burdens in his excellent account ofNORA's

land banking charge. See Alexander, supra note 27, at 755-57. Direct confirmation of the
burdens from the chair of NORA's board, Herschel Abbott, appear in an e-mail exchange
between Mr. Abbott and Professor David M arcello. Marcello had taken the position that the
2006 amendments allow NORA only to expropriate blighted property, not to transfer it to the
private sector for redevelopment, and further restrict NORA's acquisitions to individual
blighted properties that were virtual public nuisances, thereby disabling it from designating
corrununity improvement projects and assembling multiple parcels, blighted or otherwise. In
consequence, Marcello states that "aggressive reliance [by NORA] on expropriation would
be woefully ill-founded." David A. Marcello, Housing Redevelopment Strategies in the Jv.rike
of Katrina and Anti-Keio Constitutional Amendments:

Mapping a Path Through the

Landscape ofDisaster, 53 Lov. L. R.Ev. 763, 76 8 (2008). In his response, Mr. Abbott agreed
with Professor Marcello-stating that NORA's eminent domain power would be used only
"on a single house basis" "to get rid of crack houses and other public nuisances" and to
acquire property that would "remain[] in public ownership."

Id at 779 n.72.

subsequently has taken a somewhat more

of its power to transfer

aggressive view

NORA

expropriated individual blighted properties, emboldened perhaps by its success at trial in New
Orleans Redevelopment Authority

v.

Johnson, which susta ined NORA's use of the power to

transfer such property to Habitat for Humanity, a private entity. See infra notes 128-129 and
accompanying text.
UNOP, supra note 21, § 5.4.4.3. To date, ORM has been its principal partner, and

42.

this charge has channeled virtually all of NORA's activities.
dispositions

NORA's acquisitions and

are designed to support ORM's comm itment to provide $ 1 . l

billion in

infrastructure and related projects to revitalize neighborhoods in seventeen target recovery
districts.

See Press Release, City of N e w Orleans Mayor's Office of Commc'ns, City
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domain to unsnarl otherwise insuperable title problems that discourage
investment in neighborhoods and areas that the marketplace has
largely shunned.43 The fourth appears in UNOP's charge to NORA to
"design the property transfer mechanisms necessary to implement the
neighborhood cluster program."44 The last task is NORA's employment
of eminent domain to resubdivide lots and blocks, when appropriate, to
respond to the shifting footprint of the c ity's population, infrastructure
capacity and location, and land uses.45

2.

NORA Private Sector Transfers of Expropriated Property
NORA cannot discharge these functions if it is unable to transfer

expropriated properties to private entities.

Without the funds it

Announces First 17 Target Recovery Zones (Mar. 29, 2007), http://w ww.cityofuo.com/
portal.aspx?portal= 1&load=-/PortalModules/ViewPressRelease.ascx&itemid=3 813;
Telephone Interview with John J. Marshall, supra note 37. NORA's 2008 work program calls
for the expropriation of approximately l 000 blighted properties strategically located in
relation to anticipated ORM infrastructure improvements or projects or to redevelopment
properties acquired

by

not-for-profit private

redevelopers.

NORA

also

anticipates

transferring to the private sector another 5000 Road Home properties through 20 l 0 as well as
1500 tax-adjudicated properties transferred to it by other city agencies. Telephone Interview
with John J. Marshall, supra note 37.
43.
The magnitude of this effort is detailed by Ariella Cohen, Hurdles to Heirship:
Word of Mouth Inheritance Backs Some Siblings out of Family Homes (Aug. 4, 2008),
http://www.appleseednetwork.org/Media/AppleseedintheNews/tabid/11 O/Entr yID/203/Defau
lt.aspx. Frank Alexander observes that these title problems beset properties coming to
NORA from various sou rces, including tax adjudication and code enforcement.

See

Alexander, supra note 27, at 733, 739-43. He notes title problems as well with so-called "heir
property," which in many New Orleans inner city areas passes within the same family from
generation to generation without probate or other process establishing the successor owners'
identity and title. Id at 732. He also worries that doubts concerning the city's condemnation

powers raised by the state's 2006 constitutional amendments must be resolved in the city's
favor before its power to transfer expropriated property to private parties is secured. Id at

7 43. A final title issue is posed by obsolete paper subdivisions recorded decades ago that
abound throughout the city's high risk areas. Telephone Interview with Stephen Villavaso,
UNOP Co-Author, in New Orleans, La. (June 20, 2008).
44.
One of the alternatives-parcel swaps--considered by the city under the fourth
application was premised on two considerations: NORA's legal authority to become a
depository of or to acquire a substantial inventory of properties and the expectation that the
post-Katrina population and housing needs of higher risk, lower elevation areas would
decrease while those of lower risk, higher elevation areas would stabilize or increase. Under
the alternative, parcels in the former locations would be acquired principally by purchase
although eminent domain might be used to acquire strategic "hold-out" parcels or those beset
by title difficulties. The parcels' former owners who chose to return to or remain in the city
would then be provided with parcels in NORA's inventory that meet the city's locational
criteria for "clustering" and "densification." The program would seek to have the transferee,
lower risk parcel positioned as close as possible to the transferor parcel to minimize or avoid
social disruption within impacted neighborhoods.
Interview with Ed Blakely, Director,
Mayor's Office of Recovery Management, in New Orleans, La. (June 5, 2007).
45.
See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
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receives from the properties' sale, it lacks the resources to reenter the
Requiring

market to purchase or expropriate additional properties.
NORA

to retain these parcels or transfer them

only to other

governmental agencies, moreover, also defeats the neighborhood
revitalization goals it shares with ORM.

Relatively few of these

properties are needed for governmental facilities.
maintaining

them

would

overwhelm

NORA's

The cost of
meager

annual

acquisition and maintenance budget. Most important, rejuvenation of
the neighborhoods demands that these properties return to private
ownership,

initiative,

and

use.

Renovation, new

construction,

calculation of investment risk and return, and most important, vitality
and excitement for the restored neighborhood: these are private sector
functions for which NORA may perhaps be the midwife, but not the
parent.46
At this writing, the legal turbulence following adoption of the
Louisiana constitutional amendments in late

2006 has contributed to

New Orleans' failure to pursue either of the last two charges, to
designate a single Community Improvement Project, or to establish a
land bank of the scope anticipated by the city's mayor.47 Indeed, Part

N discloses that the state's 2006 amendments can plausibly be
interpreted to preclude the city's transfer of any expropriated parcel
blighted or otherwise-to the private sector.
III.

KELO, EMINENT DOMAIN, AND THE ANTI-KELO FORMAT
Conclusions regarding the principal patterns reflected in the

states' post-Keio responses must remain tentative at this writing. None
of them has been authoritatively construed by a state supreme court.
Oversimplification threatens facile summary, moreover.

To date, at

least forty-two states have adopted measures, a number of which
undertake complex revisions of constitutional property/takings clauses
or of some combination of eminent domain, urban development, and
civil procedure statutes.
It is clear, however, that most states tempered their initial distress
with Keio as the learning process matured.48 Very few adopted what

supra note 37.

46.

Telephone Interview with John J. Marshall,

4 7.

Telephone Interview with Ed Blakely, supra note 44.

Professor Sornin's evaluation of the nation's post-Keio measures concludes with
48.
his statement that "much of the proposed legislation is likely to have little effect and may
simply represent 'position-taking' intended to mollify public opinion." Somin, supra note 7,
at 1 90.

In a subsequent study, he specified that of thirty-six measures analyzed, "twenty-two
for property owners," and

. . . are largely symbolic in nature, providing little or no protection

"[ s]everal of the remainder were enacted by states that had little or no history of condemning
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this Article dubs anti-eminent domain "nuclear" options. A somewhat
larger group imposed substantive constraints on eminent domain's use
for urban revitalization, principally
restrictively.
significant

The largest group,
but

modifications.49

less

dramatic

by

defining

procedural

Part 11 features

"blight"

however, favored an
the

and

more

array of

compensatory

first two groups

because

Louisiana's 2006 amendments will likely be construed to place the
state somewhere between them.
A.

Some Preliminary Drafting Conundrums: "Economic
Development" and Pn·vate Transfers

"Economic

development"

·

and

government's

transfer

of

expropriated property to private entities are the betes noires of anti
Kelo sentiment. How might a post-Keio measure be drafted to address

each element?
There is no simple answer.

Banning both outright as invalid

public uses is not an option because each is firmly and favorably
embedded in state constitutions, legislation, and practice.
Private transfers and the more imposing delegation of the eminent
domain power to private entities have been commonplace since the
nineteenth century.50

Unsurprisingly, therefore, post-Keio measures

restricting these transfers are replete with exemptions, qualifications,
and escape clauses.

Private entities to whom eminent domain

property for economic development." Ilya Somin, The Limits ofBacklash: Assessing the
Political Response to Keio, 93 MrNN. L. REv. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 3), avaJlable
athttp://ssrn.com/abstract_id=976298 (last visited Nov. 22, 2008).
49. These changes include more liberal attorneys', mediators', and appraisers' fees
and relocation payments to condernnees; elevated standards of just compensation with
increases required for acquisition of residences and o f property destined for a more lucrative
use; heightened standards for accountability and documentation/justification of such agency
actions as blight and redevelopment parcel and area boundary detenninations; a related
increase in judicial scrutiny and burden of proof required to justify these agency actions;
imposition of supermajority voting requirements by elected officials for approval of agency
actions; establishment of eminent domain "ombudsmen" to protect condemnee interests;
avoidance of "planning blight" by requiring commencement of redevelopment projects within
tightened deadlines; heightened burden on agencies to show "necessity" of parcel acquisition,
especially for unblighted parcels and recourse to eminent domain rather than acquisition by
voluntary transfer; and the vesting of various rights of first refusal in condernne es to preclude
expropriated property's transfer within stated time periods to other private parties or the
property's utilization for a purpose other than that supporting the agency's eminent domain
petition.
50. See Todd A. Rogers, A Dubious Development: Tax Increment Financing and
Economically Motivated Conde111J1t1J ion, 1 7 REv. LITIG. 145, 152-53 ( 1 998); Harry N.
Scheiber, Property Law, Expropdation, aJJd Resource Allocation by the Government: The
Umted States 1789-1910, 33 J. ECON. HIST. 232, 237 ( 1 973).
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authority has been delegated51 or who function as common carriers or
furnish public utilities52 may use or own expropriated private property.
State legislatures may authorize these transfers by general law53 or on a
case-by-case basis.54

Favored state agencies receive exemptions.55

Likewise exempted are grandfathered projects56 or those undertaken in
areas defined by political jurisdiction or other classification.51
Cabining "economic development" has proven to be a fool's
errand.

However problematic the phrase's treatment by the Kelo

majority, its presence as one of eminent domain's goals is confirmed
by its traditional use to acquire land for roads, airports, seaports, public
utilities, common carriers, and other vehicles of commerce.

The

power supports the many public-private partnerships that states now
embrace for economic development through their spending, taxing and
police powers in order to offset the loss of formerly generous federal
funding for such vital state needs as transportation and highway
construction.58

A

categorical

ban

on

economic

development,

moreover, would clash both with other constitutional or statutory
provisions encouraging its pursuit and with the states ' aggressive use
of these powers to attract industry and other sources of economic
growth.59
To be

truly effective,

moreover, post- Ke/o measures must

disallow eminent domain-based economic development rather than
merely discount it as a factor that independently satisfies the public use
51.

I N D. Com: ANN. § 32-24-4- 1 (West Supp. 2008 ); MONT. CODI' ANN. § 7-30-

1 02(44) (2007 ).
52.

GA. CODE ANN. § 2- 1 - 1 (4 )( 8 ) (2008); IND. CODE ANN. § 32-24-4.5 ( 1 )(a)(3).

53.

FLA. CONST. art. x. § 6(c).

54.

ALASKA STAT. § 09.55 .240( 1) (2006).

55.

TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 2206.<l0 l (c)( 2 ) (Vernon 2008) ( port authorities and

navigation and reclamation districts).
56.

2006 Minn. Laws ch. 2 1 4, § 22(b), included in Historical and Statutory Notes to

MINN. STAT. ANN. 1 1 7.025 (West Supp. 2008 ) (grandfathering all eminent domain actions
commenced in tax increment financing districts on or prior to February I , 2008 )
57.

.

2007 Va . Acts chs. 882, 90 1 , 926, i11cludcd 1/1 History and Statutory Notes to VA .

CODE ANN. � 2 5 . 1 - 1 08(3 ) (Supp. 2008) ( providing in identical third and fourth enactments
exemptions for redevelopment and housing authorities to acquire property pursuant to plans
approved prior to January 1 . 2007):

sc�

also 26 PA. CONS. ST:\T. § 203( b )( 3 ) ( 4 ) ( S u pp . 2008)
-

(allowing expropriation of areas deemed blighted prior to May 4. 2006. in various classes or
categories of cities).
58.

See. e.g. . DF.LOITTE RESEARCH, CLOSING AMERICA'S INFRASTRUCTURE GAP: THE

ROLE OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS (2007). http://W\\ow.deloitte.com/dtt/cda/doc/content/

us_ps_pPPUS_final( I ).pdf; D. Joseph Darr. Cum.·nt Tn·nds in Public-Pn.r ntc Partnershp
i

Laws, 28 CONSTR. LAW. 53 (2008).
59.
LA. CONST. art. VI, § 2 1

(expropriation of land for private industrial use to

achieve "economic impact"); TENN. CODE ANN. ;i 29- 1 7- 1 02( 2 J( E ) (Supp. 2008) (expropri
ation of land for industrial parks for econom i c development goals).
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requirement.

The UNOP example

demonstrates why:

redevelopment-based eminent domain serves

an

83 :395
namely,

array of pwposes,

only one of which is economic development Noneconomic develop
ment purposes that may be attended by economic consequences
cannot be equated with economic development purposes if the latter
terms are to have intelligible boundarie s . But economic consequences
are permissible under post Keio measures if the purpose of the
-

measure giving rise to them is not itself solely or primarily economic
development.
The point is confirmed by a few queries.

Is San Francisco's

commitment to historic preservation motivated exclusively or even
principally by economic development?

What about New York City's

successful program to eliminate sex businesses and vice from its Times
Square Broadway Theater district? Does New Orleans err in a UNOP
Plan that equates only one of its ten planning sectors with "economic
development"? Is NORA's effort to reduce crime in blighted neighbor
hoods through targeted acquisition of troubled properties

an

exercise in

economic development?
Eminent domain has been used in aid of each of the foregoing
activities and,

of course, an open-ended class of others.

Each

undoubtedly engages economic issues at one level or another and, if
successfully undertaken, will indeed hike the host city's tax receipts.
But labeling these activities as "economic development" puts the cart
before the horse.

Their economic benefits are a significant but

secondary consequence of the fulfillment of other human and social
needs such as confirmation of community identity, the creation of a
healthy and safe environment, or enj oyment of the fun and fantasy in
the world's most fabled entertainment district.60
60.

For an extended assessment of the many legally recognized ways of experiencing

and responding to urban space beyond its status as an economic good, see generally JOHN J.
COSTONIS, lCONS AND ALIENS:

LAW, AESTHETICS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE ( 1 989).

Urban ecologist Walter Firey speaks to this point in rejecting the rigid perspective of those
who "have made of spatial adaptation a strictly economic phenomenon. They have begun by
regarding all social systems as purely economic units.

They have then postulated that the

only socially relevant quality of space is its costfulness as an economic good."
FTREY, LAND USE fN CENTRAL BOSTON 19 ( 1 947).

WALTER

In his evaluation of New London's

development plan, Professor Richard Brooks counters such reductionism by stressing that the
plan's focus on the city's maritime character and h i story highl ights a
crucial element in New London's identity, based upon its history, its surroundings,
and this continuous effort to perpetuate that heritage.

Every city

has its identity

and those who live, work, and visit that city can share in that identity.

Without

exaggeration, one might say that the development plan expressed New London's
collective memory and identity as a marine city continuing to seek sustainability in
a changing economy. The sustainability as a maritime city means the presence of

41 1
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Purpose and consequence have become confused in the post

Keio dialogue. Keio started the ball rolling by trivializing eminent
domain-based urban redevelopment as merely government's entitle
ment to favor the higher private taxpayer. Unlinking eminent domain
from substantive redevelopment goals and converting it into an adjunct
of the taxing power laid the conceptual basis for repositioning urban
redevelopment exclusively as a subcategory of economic development.
Anti-Keio proponents seized on Justice O' Connor's catchy "Motel

6

for Ritz-Carlton" phrasemaking to disregard redevelopment goals that
not only can't be equated with economic development, but that render
private sector investment feasible by securing such other, more
fundamental values as neighborhood safety or civic identity and pride.
The Court could and should have avoided this scenario. New
London's pervasive urban problems-many similar to those besetting
New Orleans pre- and post-Katrina-afforded the

Court ample

opportunity to confirm that eminent domain-based urban development
is an independent activity designed to serve a variety of land use goals,
many

of

which

may

indeed

generate

beneficial

economic

61

consequences.

By themselves, therefore, restrictions on "economic develop
ment" do not advance the anti-Keio agenda. On the contrary, measures
most hostile to

Keio ignore economic development altogether.62

Restrictions on the latter in other measures, it will be shown, do not
restrain eminent domain on the basis of economic development's
largely unspecified content but by linking the concept to

other

an economy that supports the way of life of its residents and protects the marine
environment.
Richard 0. Brooks, Keio

and

the "Whaling City':·

The Failure of the Supreme Court's

Opportunity to Articulate a Public Purpose of Sustainability,
TAKINGS: FOUR ESSAYS, supra note

61.

in THE

SUPREME COURT AND

29, at 5, 8.

Richard Brooks observes:
The [New London Redevelopment] Plan was more than an economic

development plan. . . . The plan also proposed the environmental c leanup of more
than a century of marine-industrial activities as well as the protection and
restoration of important wetlands, improvements of the sewer system, and control
of odor pollution from the waste-water treatment facility in the area. In short, the
ninety-acre plan was, to all intents and purposes, a classic redevelopment plan
seeking to take advantage of some on-going public projects, but adding and
coordinating them with some new public and private initiatives. . . .

[T]he

development plan represented a bold new effort to continue New London's
maritime heritage with access to the sea, water-related recreation, and a historical
reminder of what New London was all about.
Brooks, supra note 60, at 7-8.

62.

See infra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
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which

are

closed-ended

8 3 :395

public

use

inventories, private transfers, and restrictions on eminent domain
based urban redevelopment.63

The case for economic development's

efficacy as a self-contained restraint collapses altogether when even a
staunch anti-Keio academician complains that twenty-two post Keio
-

measures utilizing this criterion provide "little or no real protection for
property owners."64
B.

The Anti Kelo
-

Format

Post-Keio measures most hostile

to eminent domain-based

redevelopment display some combination of four elements in addition
to economic development restrictions. Those less hosti le e ither avoid
these elements or substantially qualify their scope.

The elements

include a closed-ended inventory of public uses, outright or invasive
bans on eminent domain's use for urban redevelopment, similar bans
on private transfers, and enactment of the measure in constitutional
form rather than-or in addition to--statutory form.

C

Open- versus Closed-Ended Public Use Inventories
One way of containing the eminent domain power is to restrict its

functions strictly to activities expressly deemed to be "public uses."
The federal and, until

Keio, state constitutions or eminent domain

statutes rejected this closed-ended approach, leaving it to the judiciary
to assess the phrase 's scope in relation to the legislature 's conception of
imperative social and economic needs.
opposed

by

those

who

fear that

But this reactive posture is
public

officials

may

prove

disrespectful of private property rights, or be predisposed to corrupt or
otherwise pernicious relationships with the redevelopment system's
private actors.65

63.

For them, nothing short of "nuclear bans" on private

Any eminent domain-based activity that substantially serves a public use other

than economic development is unscathed by provisions discounting consideration of the latter
in the public use calculation. But the activity cannot proceed or will otherwise be hobbled if
that use is not included in an inventory in a closed-ended state, see

infra notes 65-73

and

accompanying text; engages a category of property not included within a narrowly drawn
blight definition, see infra notes 82-86 and accompanying text; or requires the participation of
a private recipient or user in states that ban or restrict transfers for private use or ownership,
see

infra notes 95- 1 0 2 and accompanying text.
64.
65 .

See Somin, supra note 7, at 1 84.

See CASTLE COAL., supm note 11, at 23 3-41.
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transfers and on eminent domain 's redevelopment uses66 are truly
satisfactory.
The closed-ended drafting option affords them a vehicle that
features a litany of approved publi c uses, and rules out any eminent
domain use not expressly approved in the inventory. Recurrent entries
include publicly owned facilities and buildings; transpor tation facilities
including highways, ports, navigation improvements, airports, and
railroads; public and private utilities and common carriers; drainage
and flood control networks and facilities; private uses incidental to the
expropriated property's dominant public use; blight remediation and
area redevelopment; and parks, convention centers, and recreational
centers open to the public. Expressly disapproved as public uses

are

economic development and the transfer or use of expropriated property
for the private benefit of private e ntities. 67
Open-ended inventories do not enumerate specific public use
categories,68 although they may supplement the general con cept with
examples of activities deemed to fall within it.

The generic "public

use" concept remains vital, however, as a residual source of authority
for the power's exercise.
The

closed-ended option

containment at a dubious cost.

purchases apparent

certainty and

Government's purposes are not static,

of course, as the last century's evolution of the police and eminent
domain powers in land use law confirms. 69
What lies ahead for American cities, I believe, is almost certain to
demand

enlarged

governmental

engagement

in

urban

systems

66.
See Jnfra notes 77-81 and accompanying text (ban on eminent domain-based
development); infra notes 98-101 and accompanying text (ban on private transfers).
67.
The format is exemplified by VA. CODE ANN. § 1 -2 1 9. l (A) (2008) in its statement
that "[t]he term 'public uses' . . . is hereby defined as to embrace only the acquisition of
property where [the exerCise of eminent domain supports the purposes inventoried]"
(emphasis added). For other closed-ended provisions, see, for example, KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 26-501 (b) (200 I ); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § l 62-K:2(IX-a) (Supp. 2008).
68.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1 , § 816(4) (Supp. 2007) ("Nothing in this section . . .
prohibit[s] a . . . governing body from exercising the power of eminent domain for purposes
not otherwise prohibited by subsection l . ); MICH. CONST. art. X, § 2 (eliminating economic
development as a public use and providing that "[p]rivate property otherwise may be taken
for reasons of public use as that term is understood on the effective date of the amendment to
this constitution that added this paragraph").
69.
The Supreme Court approved zoning as a police power exercise, for example, as a
response to land use needs created by the nation's increasing urbanization. See Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387-97 ( 1 926). The Court subsequently approved
eminent domain-based slum clearance in response to the decline of many American cities in
the early- and mid-twentieth-century period. See Bennan v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 35-36
(1954).
"
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redevelopment initiatives.

10

the
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use

of

eminent

domain-based

But we need not ponder mega-trends to conclude that the closed
ended option can produce pernicious consequences. The risk of these
consequences

is written all over the New Orleans

case study.

Inexplicably, Louisiana, unlike Ohio11 and other states,72 does not
include eminent domain's deployment to combat a natural disaster or
public peril in its public purpose inventory. Compounding this failure
of public policy, Louisiana's closed-ended provision is a

constitutional

measure, forcing its judiciary, legislature and local governments to
ransack its impoverished text in search of language-any language
that might serve as a predicate for the power's use. 73
D

Banning or Restricting Eminent Domain s Use for Urban
Redevelopment
Keio did not call into question a municipality's power to employ

eminent domain for substantive planning purposes.

Even Justice

O'Connor approved its use for blight removal, objecting instead to the
majority's support of private transfers for "economic development."74
Her distinction between these two uses of the power, it bears emphasis,
is echoed in the decisions of the many state courts that likewise oppose
the power's use for economic

development, but not

for blight

mitigation or area redevelopment.15

70.
71.

See infra note 1 50 and accompanying text.

OHIO REV.

CODE ANN. § 1 728.01 (C)(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2008) defines an
"impacted city" as one that has been "declared a major disaster area, or part of a major
disaster area, pursuant to the [federal] 'Disaster Relief Act of 1 970,' . . . and has been
extensively damaged or destroyed by a major disaster." Subsection (I) of this provision
defines a "major disaster" as "any tornado, storm, flood, high water, wind-driven water, tidal

wave, earthquake, fire, or other catastrophe." Id § 1 728.01 (I). In their pathbreaking course

book, Disasters and the Law: Katrina and Beyond, Daniel Farber and Jirn Chen observe that

a "disaster law" book is required because it "is hard to think of anything equally important
that has received such little sustained attention from lawyers and law professors." FARBER &
CHEN, supra note 1 5, at xix.
72.
See GA. CODE ANN. § 22- 1 - l ( l ){A)(iii) (Supp. 2008).

73.

Significantly, NORA's founding statute does anticipate the possibility of eminent

domain's use in redevelopment areas "as a result of an act of God, fire, bombing, riot, or other
catastrophe" and permits the city's governing body to waive conditions relating to approvals
of community improvement projects. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33:4720.57(G) (Supp.
2008). Because this statutory provision predates the Louisiana constitutional amendments,
however, it is doubtful that it survives the amendments' closed-ended inventory.
74.
See supra note 9 and accompanying text.

75.
The cases are collected in llya Somin, Is Post-Kelo Eminent Domain Reform Bad
for the Poor?, 101 Nw. U. L. REv. 193 1 , 1936-37 n.30 (2007).
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But the anti-Keio format is more radical because its supporters
fear that economic development goals may be disguised in blight
remediation garb. 76

The format not only bans the former as an

independent public use, but seeks to ban or severely shrink the power's
blight remediation function when used to acquire individual parcels

and, even more determinedly, when used to assemble multiple
properties in a project area. This effort often overlaps with provisions
restricting private transfers, which are addressed independently in the
following section.

1.

The Nuclear Option: Banning Blight Takings
The post-Keio measures adopted by Florida and New Mexico

illustrate the nuclear option because they flatly ban expropriation of
private property for blight remediation or slum clearance.77

Florida

cancels the power's use "for the purpose of abating or eliminating a
public nuisance,"78 or "for the purpose of preventing or eliminating
slum or blight conditions,"79 and deems both activities a violation of
the state constitution's "public purpose" requirement.80

New Mexico

follows suit by denying local governments authority to employ
eminent domain to address metropolitan redevelopment concems.81

2.

The Nonnuclear Options: Shrinking the Blight Concept
Shrinking the blight concept also impedes eminent domain's use,

particularly if the option is further linked to private transfer restrictions.
Post-Keio measures manifest various degrees of shrinkage running
from blight definitions that effectively reduce blight to its origins in
public nuisance law to others of marginally lesser severity to a final
group that leave largely intact the broader blight and slum clearance
parameters developed in the mid-twentieth century.82
76.

See CASTLE COAL., supra note 1 1 , at 3-4; Somin, supra. note 7, at 265-67.

77.

The Florida and New Mexico provisions merit comparison with South Dakota's

somewhat less "nuclear" ban, which, unlike the former provisions, permits expropriation of
blighted property if the property remains in public ownership. See 2006 S.D. H.B. I 080

(signed into law Feb. 27, 2006). As noted in notes 98-102 and accompanying text, infra, a
categorical ban on transfer precludes use of public-private partnerships as a vehicle for urban
redevelopment.
78.

FLA. STAT ANN . § 73.014( 1 ) (West Supp. 2008).

79.
80.

Id § 73.0 14(2).

FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6(a).
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-60A-3(C) (Supp. 2008). Section 3- 1 8 - 1 O(B)(3) provides an
81.
exemption for vacating obsolete plats.
82.
For a detailed state-by-state analysis of post-Keio measures running the gamut
described

in the text, see Sornin, supra note 48, at 3 1 -40.
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Among the nuisance-type standards are those found in the New
Hampshire,83

Virginia,84

and

statutes.Rs

Oregon

Somewhat

less

restrictive but still both severe and precise in their detailed standards
are measures that enumerate multiple considerations that in one or
6
more combinations warrant a blight determination. 8
Two additional restrictions may be imposed.

The first, which

allows government to expropriate but not to transfer blighted property,
undermines eminent domain's use in

a

public-private partnership mode

by eliminating the private sector as

a recipient of expropriated

property.87 The second, which attacks the power's use to assemble and
consolidate multiple strategic parcels, requires that each c ondemned
parcel must be blighted.88

This provision conflicts with statutes

permitting the inclusion of nonblighted properties in area-wide project
designations89 and with Bennan's holding that the acquisition of these
properties

does

not violate the

Fifth

Amendment's

public

use

requirement.
From the opposite end of the

spectrum are provisions that

continue to define the urban redevelopment enterprise expansively by
incorporating blight prevention goals such as "sound growth" and
avoidance

of "social and economic

liability,"90 or by

approving

83. See N.H. REv. STAT ANN. § 1 62-K:2 IX-a(3) (Supp. 2008) (authorizing
condemnation of "structures beyond repair, public nuisances, structures unfit for human
habitation or use, and abandoned property when such structures or property constitute a
menace to health and safety").
84. VA. CODE ANN . § 1 -2 1 9. l(B) (2008) (defining blighted property as property "that
endangers the public health or safety . . . and is (i) a public nuisance or (ii) an individual . . .
structure . . . that is beyond repair or unfit for human occupancy or use").
OR. REv. STAT. § 35.015 (2)(a) (2007) (allowing that property may be expropriated
85.
that "constitutes a danger to the health or safety of the community by reason of
contamination, dilapidated structures, improper or insufficient water or sanitary facilities, or
any combination of these factors").
See, e.g, GA. CODE ANN . § 22- 1 - 1 ( 1 )(A)-(B) (Supp. 2008); MICH. COMP. LAWS
86.
ANN. § 2 1 3 .23(3)(8)(a)-(h) (West Supp. 2008).
The obstacles created by the no-transfer language are addressed jnfra note 128
87.
and accompanying text. The expropriation but nontransfer option appears in the many post
Ke/o measures that preclude expropriation "for the purpose" of transferring its ownership or
use to another private party, assuming that courts construe this language to address the result
rather than the pwpose of the exercise. On the result/purpose distinction, see 1nfra note 1 27
and accompanying text. Illustrative of these measures is N.D. CENT. CODE § 3 2 - 1 5-0 1 (2)
(Supp. 2007), which bans expropriation "for the use of, or ownership by, any private
individual or entity, unless that property is necessary for conducting a common carrier or
utility business."
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 24-2-2(a)( l ) (LexisNexis 2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 2288.
11 ( 1 ).
89.
See statutes cited supra note 6.
90. The statutes are collected in Somin, supra note 75, at 1933 nn.7- 1 1 .
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economic development if the latter i s one of the proj ect's "secondary
impacts."91 These measures may treat blight remediation as a category
distinct from economic development,92 or exempt urban-renewal-based
uses of the eminent domain power from private transfer bans,93 or both.
Area-wide as well as parcel-by-parcel blight determinations may be
made, moreover, subject to conditions supporting the reasonableness
of including nonblighted property in the eventual project assemblage.94

E

Restncting Pn'vate Transfers
The difficulty of distinguishing economic development from

other redevelopment purposes undoubtedly accounts for measures that
opt to bar o r restrict the transfer o f expropriated property to other
private entities.

This blunt approach95 sidesteps the definitional

problem in favor of the simpler task of exempting from its reach
private transfers undertaken by public utilities96 or common carriers.97
A number o f these measures also exempt blight remediation but
mitigate the definitional challenge by shrinking blight's scope under
one of the

alternatives described

in

the previous

Part.

This

indiscriminate approach, like the latter, includes both nuclear and
nonnuclear options.

1.

Nuclear Option: A (Close to) Flat Ban on Private Transfers
A categorical ban on private transfers without more obliterates

eminent

domain's

use

for

urban

renewal

as

a

public/private

undertaking by eliminating the private partner without whom urban
redevelopment
constraints

on

often

cannot

economic

practicably

development

proceed.
or

blight

Correlative
removal

are

unnecessary although they often appear in measures alongside the
nuclear option.

91.
Texas ' measure, for example, permits eminent domain for economic development
provided that the latter "is a secondary purpose resulting from . . . municipal urban renewal
activities to eliminate an existing affirmative harm on society from slum or blighted areas."
TEX. Gov'r CODE ANN. § 2206.00 1(b)(3) (Vernon 2008).
92.
See, e.g, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 532.2 7 1 (2) {West Supp. 2008); N.H. R.Ev. STAT. ANN .
§ 203 .3(XIV)(a)(3)-(4) (Supp. 2008).
93.
SeeTEX. Gov'T CODEANN. § 2206.00l(b)(3).
94.
See statutes cited supra note 6.
Indiscriminate restrictions on private transfers substantially overshoot Justice
95.
O'Connor's d issenting viewpoint, which fmds them unobjectionable if the eminent domain
based measure remedies an affirmative harm. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
See IND. CODE ANN. § 32-24-4.5(l )(a)(3) (LexisNexis Supp. 2008).
96.
See GA. CooEANN. § 2-1 -1(1 ) (Supp. 2008).
97.
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Earlier discussion clarifies that because none of the post-Kele
measures is unqualified, none absolutely bans private transfers.

But

the amendments to the Florida,98 New Hampshire,99 and North Dakota
constitutions100 and to South Dakota's redevelopment statute 1 0 1 come
close. Florida 's provision is the most restrictive of the four because, as
supplemented by statute, wi it bans

both

the expropriation

and private

transfer of redevelopment parcels, while the latter three states ban the
parcel's private transfer, but not its expropriation.

2.

Nonnuclear Options
A variety o f less categorical options have also been devised. One

bars expropriation or private transfers if the current use of the target
property falls within a proscribed category. 103 Another prevents local
governments from executing private transfers for a specified nwnber
of years following the property's expropriation.

South Dakota, for

example, grants the former owner-condemnee a right of first refusal
prior to the property's sale to other private entities within seven years
of its taking.

Should the former owner decline, the property must be

sold on a competitive, open-bid basis. 1 04
The option linking a time delay to the former owner's right of
first refusal could prove as potent in practice as the nuclear option.
Public-private partnerships

in the

urban redevelopment setting require

FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6(c) provides that "[p]rivate property taken by eminent
98.
domain . . . after January 2, 2007, may not be conveyed to a natural person or private entity
except as provided by general law passed by a three-fifths vote of the membership of each
house of the Legislature."
N.H. CONST. art. 12-a provides that "[n)o part of a person's property shall be
99.
taken by eminent domain and transferred, directly or indirectly, to another person if the taking
is for the purpose of private development or other private use of the property."
I 00. N.D. CONST. art. I, § 1 6 provides that "[p )rivate property shall not be taken for the
use of, or ownership by, any private individual or entity, unless that property is necessary for
conducting a common carrier or utility business."
1 0 1 . S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1 1 -7-22. l (Supp. 2008) forbids counties, municipalities
and redevelopment commissions from expropriating private property "[f]or transfer to any
private person, nongovernmental entity, or other public-private business entity."
1 02. FLA. STAT ANN. § 7 3 . 0 1 4( 1 )-(2) (West 2008).
1 03. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 1 2- 1 773(a) (Supp. 2005) (conservation area); LA. CONST. art.
VI, § 2 1 (D) (homestead).
1 04. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1 1 -7-22.2. A closely related but less potent option is
conferring a right of first refusal on former owners if the property is not devoted to the use
for which it was originally expropriated. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 1 l -47-1 70(c) (LexisNexis
Supp. 2007); MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-30-322 (2007).
.

2008]

419

AMERICAN CITIES IN POST-KELO ERA

an integrated acquisition-disposition process and a flexible public
private partner negotiation process, both of which the option denies.105
E

Constitutional versus Statutory or Combined Constitutional/
Statutory Options
At first blush, many observers would likely agree with the claim

that incorporating post-Keio change s in a constitutional amendment is
"unambiguously the most effective way"106 to address objections to the

Keio holding. The claim is not without its appeal. As a foundational
right, property merits protection in a foundational document.

The

change 's durability, moreover, is better assured in a constitution, which
is less easily amended than a statute. These considerations apparently
proved persuasive to the seven states that, at this writing, have chosen
11
this route. 0
But constitutionalizing post-Keio measures is not without its risks

for

Keio opponents .

property clauses

Abstract constitutional texts in general and

in particular afford courts ample interpretative

leeway: the terms "health and safety," "economic development," and
transfers "for" such goals as "private use" or "private development"
are anything but self-defining.

Courts attuned to a community's

redevelopment needs will be disposed to construe them to favor rather
than undermine eminent domain's use when, as in the New Orleans
case study, a contrary interpretation will effectively shut down eminent
domain-based redevelopment.108
Outcome s unhelpful to the anti-Keio format's intent can also be
anticipated because constitutional property clauses cut a much broader
swath than state eminent domain or urban redevelopment statutes-the
two principal

targets

of nonconstitutional post-Keio

measures.

Redefining "public use," for example, implicates not only govern
ment's management of urban redevelopment, but its exercise of the
spending, taxing, and police powers.
1 05.

109

Courts may choose to construe

This issue is revisited in subsequent discussion of LA. CONST.

infra notes 1 30- 1 32 and accompanying text.
I 06. CASTLE COAL., supra note 1 1 , at 44.

art. I, § 4( H) . See

107. The seven states are New Hampshire, Florida, Georgia, Michigan, Louisiana,
North Dakota, and South Carolina. Nevada has underway an initiative-Assembly Joint
Resolution 3-that, if approved in 2009 by the state legislature and in 20 1 0 by the state's

form as well. See id
See infra note 1 28 and accompanying text (discussing New Orleans
Redevelopment Authodty v. Johnson).
voters, will assume constitutional
1 08.

1 09.

In Louisiana, the phrase "public purpose," which is defined in LA. CONST. art. I,

§ 4(B)(3) to exclude economic development, also appears in

six other constitutional
for activities that

provisions, each of which authorizes activities or governmental support
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cts with settled
these reformulations very narrowly to avoid confli
understandings of these other powers.

IY.

LOUISIANA'S CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS
Louisiana's post-Keio response incorporates a tail-chasing maze

of bans, qualifications, and exemptions.

Tedious and tentative as its

detailed analysis most certainly is, the exercise affords a real-world
scenario against which to evaluate both the Keio controvers y 's most
perplexing challenges

as

well

as

to portray the dead end to which

libertarian anti-Keio critique leads for American cities with pressing
eminent domain redevelopment needs.
The exercise, moreover, is not an exercise in Louisiana exotica:
many of the fundamental conflicts and ambiguities that it surfaces
reappear in many of the forty-one other states' post-Keio measures.
Tragic in itself, therefore, Katrina's decimation of New Orleans, an
event that followed Keio and preceded Louisiana's post-Keio measure,
serves as a laboratory in which the adequacy of the last two e l ements
can be weighed against the public necessities created by the first.

A.

Open- or Closed-Ended Inventory
Louisiana 's provision is closed-ended.

110

When combined with its

failure to address public disasters as a public purpose

and the

possibility that the provision may also be construed to prevent private
1
transfers,1 1 its closed-ended feature could simply shut down any
eminent domain-based New Orleans' recovery strategy, including
P. 1 1 2
NORA's five charges under UNO
clearly enhance community economic welfare. See LA. CONST. art. VI, § 1 7 (zoning and land
use control), art. VI, § 23 (power of local governments to acquire property by any means,
including eminent domain), art. VII, § I (taxing power), art. Vil, § 10 (appropriation power),
art. VII, § 1 4(8)(3) (pledges of public funds, credit, or property), art. VII, § 1 4(C)
(government's power to enter into "cooperative arrangements" to implement public/private
partnerships). Louisiana has compounded the likelihood of conflict between article I, section
4 and one or more of these other constitutional provisions by failing to supplement its
constitutional measure with clarifying statutory amendments to its eminent domain or
redevelopment codes.
1 1 0. Article I, section 4(B)(2) of the Louisiana Constitution approves as "public
purposes" a general public right to a definite use of the property; continuous public
ownership of property used for public buildings, land and maritime transportation systems,
drainage, flood control and navigational protection, various recreational and cultural facilities,
public utilities, and public ports and airports; and expropriation to remove threats to public
health or safety. Section 4(BX3) negates consideration of both economic development and
enhancement of tax revenue as public purposes.
1 1 1 . See infra note I 27 and accompanying text.
1 1 2 . See supra notes 3 0-45 and accompanying text.
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Economic Development· An Insufficient Public Pmpose

B.

The Louisiana measure confirms the inefficacy of post-Keio
economic development clauses. It clearly distinguishes economic
development from urban redevelopment. The latter, presented as
authority to remove "threat[s] to public health or safety,"113 is included
in an inventory of activities expressly approved as "public purposes."
Economic development surfaces in an independent clause disquali
fying it for consideration as a public purpose.114
Both this syntax and the measure's legislative history115 insure
that, by itself, the economic development clause will not bar NORA
from utilizing its condemnation power in accordance with UNOP
expectations.116 The nine UNOP elements earlier titled as serving
11
goals other than economic development, 1 moreover, would not appear
to violate the clause. Whether or not NORA's execution of its UNOP
mandate survives the measure's other clauses, however, is more
problematic.
C.

Urban Redevelopment· Banneq U0lcome4 orRestricted in
Louisiana?

The problems commence with the measure's sole provision
addressing the authority of Louisiana local governments to engage in
eminent domain-based redevelopment. Article 1 , section 4(B)(2)(c)
qualifies as a "public purpose" the power's use for "removal of a threat
to public health or safety caused by the existing use or disuse of the
property." Does this language empower NORA to fulfill its UNOP
defined role?
The only certain response at this time is that the section does not
impose either Florida's or New Mexico's nuclear ban on redevelop
ment. But neither does the section welcome this outcome. The
difficult question for the Louisiana courts will be the extent to which
the section impedes their achievement.

113.

LA. CONST. art. I, § 4(B)(2)(c).

114.

Section 4(B)(3), id, provides that "[n]either economic development, enhancement

of tax revenue, or any incidental benefit to the public shall be considered i n determining
whether the raking or damaging of property is for a public purpose."
115.

See John J. Costonis, Eminent Domain Under the 2006 Louisiana

Constitutional

Amendments: The Legislature's Forward Pass to the Judiciary, 55 LA. B.J. 398, 403 nn.32-35
(2008).
116.

See supra notes 30-45 and accompanying text.

117.

See supra note 2 5 and accompanying text.
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Section

4(B)(2)(c) is open to an interpretation that activates

subordinate devices that may dictate this outcome.

two

The first is

sluinking the blight concept from its previously ample scope in
Louisiana jurisprudence1 18 and statute law1 19 to one more attuned to a
nineteenth-century regime of nuisance abatement or remediation. The
second is limiting NORA's power to the acquisition of individual
blighted parcels only, thereby barring NORA's assembly of multiple
parcels, some o f which may be unblighted, pursuant to its statutory
power to designate community improvement projects.
Limitation of the power's use under the first device will be
proportioned to j udicial construction

of the terms "health" and

"safety." Anti-Keio proponents will advance the plausible c laim that
the absence of the phrase "general

welfare" warrants a narrow

construction. This interpretation would bar eminent domain's use to
clear titles on heir property or unvacated subdivisions. 120 It would also
cast serious doubt on the power's use to support parcel

swaps

transferring ownership from properties in high risk locations to
properties in favored, densification areas. 1 2 1
But a more ample reading i s not out of the question.

It is

difficult, after all, to imagine two more open-ended terms than
"health" and "safety." The point is amplified in this instance because
the legislature has not detailed their content in an accompanying
amendatory statute andhas left in place generous statutory definitions

of "blighted parcel" and "blighted area."122

The amendment's legislative history, moreover, supports this
13
outcome in two respects that I have detailed elsewhere. 2 Legislative

debate

clearly

favored

Justice

O ' Connor's

support

of

urban

redevelopment, while stoutly opposing Kelo's holding that increasing
the community's tax base independent of any substantive p lanning
1 1 8.

Rejecting a challenge in

State

v.

Housing Authon·ty of New Orleans

to the

expropriation of blighted property for the construction of housing, the use of which would be
transferred to qualified private tenants, the Louisiana Supreme Court accorded local
governments great latitude in pursuing eminent domain-based redevelopment.

1 82 So. 725

(La. 1 938).

1 19. The definitions of "blight" and "blighted area" in NORA's founding statute
fit within the most generous of the three categories discussed supra notes 90-94 and

clearly

accompanying text.

See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
1 22. See statutes cited sup.ra notes 30-34. For an example ofa state's two-step process,
1 20.

121.

first, of adopting a broad constitutional provision, and second, of rendering the provision
more precise in a companion amendatory statute, see FLA. CONST. art.
ANN . § 73.014(1 )-(2) (West Supp. 2008).
1 23. See generally Costonis, supra note 1 1 5 .

X,

§ 6(a); FLA. STAT.
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concern is a public use.124 The legislature also cautioned the measure's
drafters to avoid adopting a provision that might undermine an
eventual South Louisiana recovery program. 12
Barring NORA from assembling strategic tracts of parcels, some
of which may not meet section 4(B)(2)(c)'s narrow blight definition, or
from designating community improvement projects would be a foolish
policy when, three years after Katrina, square mile after square mile of
New Orleans remain devastated, inert, unsafe, and shunned by private
markets. He nce the crucial question: does section 4(B)(2)(c) 's use of
5

,

the language "the property" require this outcome?

Should this

language be read in a collective sense-the "property" encompassing a
redevelopment area--or as referencing a single lot-Ms. Jones 's
"property"?
A

clear answer might have been available had Louisiana
supplemented its constitutional measure with clarifying amendments
to its eminent domain and redevelopment statutes. But the legislature
chose not to do so, while leaving in place NORA's authority to
condemn property throughout entire community improvement
proj ects 6 The survival of this authority in the face of the later
adopted constitutional measure, while doubtful, remains an open
question as well.
"

."12

D.

Pn'vate Transfers: Nuclear and NonnuclearRestrictions?

Louisiana's measure could plausibly be construed to author one
nuclear and two nonnuclear restrictions on private transfers. The
former could be predicated on article 1 , section 4(B)( l), which
opposes the taking of property "for predominant use by" or "for
transfer of ownership to any private person or entity." If the term "for"
refers to the result of the taking, the ban is nuclear. But if it refers to
the taking's pwpose, private transfers are not barred so long as the
project s private advantages are incidental to their public benefits. 121
The first nonnuclear restriction would arise from interpreting
section 4(B)(2)(c) to authorize condemnation, but not private
disposition of distressed property. This interpretation meshes with
'

124.
125.
126.

Id at 403 nn.32-33 & 45.
Id at 403 n.35.
See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33:4720.5 8(A) (Supp. 2008).

Court's robust
of the
fonnerly blighted property to private tenants in State v. Housing Authonty ofNew Orleans,
127.

The purpose-result distinction received the Louisiana Supreme

approval when it approved as a public use the link between expropriation and the lease
182 So. 725, 745-46 (La. 1938).
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what may be the nuclear ban construction of section 4(B)( l ) and the
additional restrictions, discussed below, on transfers imposed by
section 4(H)(l).
But a contrary position has already been sustained in Louisiana at
the trial level in a case foreshadowing what likely will be extensive
litigation addressing the Louisiana measure's many uncertainties. At
stake in New Orleans Redevelopment Authonty v. Johnson128 is the
validity under s ection

4(B)(2)(c)

of NORA's agreement to transfer an

expropriated blighted property to Habitat for Humanity, a private
entity.

The court approved NORA's position that the "removal" of

threats to health and safety under that section includes both its
condemnation

and its

transfer to a private party. In an oral statement

made from the bench, the trial judge reasoned that a contrary outcome
could not have been the Louisiana Legislature 's intent because the
eminent domain-based component of New Orleans ' recovery program
would fail if the city were required to retain ownership of its
expropriated property. 129
A second nonnuclear restriction may plausibly be predicated on

article 1 , sectio n

4(H)( 1 ) ,

which, like the South Dakota provision

examined earlier,130 subj ects the sale or lease of expropriated property
for a thirty-year period to a right of first refusal in the former owner. If
the right is declined, the property may b e sold or leased only by open
competitive bid. 131
But this constitutional text, too, admits to conflicting interpreta
tions.

4(H)(l)

Keio

opponents will argue with no little force that section

overrides section

4(B)(2)(C)

because property condemned

under the latter section is not included in the exemptions e numerated
in section

4(H) ( l ).

Contrarily, the two provisions can be viewed as

independent of one another, and, therefore, interpretation of the
former's term "removal" to cover both condemnation and disposition is

1 2 8.

No. 2007-3 1 02 (La. Dist. Ct. Ori. May 9, 2008).

1 29.

Transcript of Record at 69-70, New Orleans Redevelopment Auth., No. 2007-

3 1 02.
1 30. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1 1 -7-22.2 (Supp 2008). This statute fixes a seven- rather
than thirty-year right-of-refusal term.
131.

Article I, section 4(H)( l) ofthe Louisiana Constitution provides:

Except for leases or operation agreements for port facilities, highways, qualified
transportation facilities or airports, the state

or

its political subdivisions s ha l l not

sell or lease property which has been expropriated and held for not more than thirty
years without first offering the property to the original owner or his heir . . . at the
current fair market value, after which the property can only be transferred by
competitive bid open to the general public.
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not cut down by section 4(H)( l ) 's scythe. The latter argument
prevailed at the trial level in New Orleans Redevelopment Authority v.
Johnson and enjoys considerable support in the constitutional
132
amendment's legislative history.
E

The Louisiana Measure as a ConstitutionalAmendment

Louisiana cast its post-Kela response solely as a constitutional
measure. Earlier discussion questioned the supposed efficacy that
Kelo opponents ascribe to this route in light of the text's vague
language and the uncertain relationships both among the measure's
various clauses and between those c lauses and other constitutional or
statutory provisions.133
The Louisiana case study confirms these observations. The
amendments' employment of one open-ended term after another to
define the condemnation power's scope leaves unresolved, among
other fundamental questions, whether municipalities now face a
nuclear ban on private transfers, a qualified thirty-year obstacle to
redevelopment-based transfers, and a regressive shrinking or,
contrarily, an expansion of expropriation's scope.
Unclear linkages among the amendments' various clauses
compound these uncertainties. Does section 4(B)(2)(c)'s grant of
power to "remove" threats to health and safety, for example,
comprehend the condemnation-private disposition cycle essential to a
public-private partnership? Or are private transfers ruled out by
section 4(B)( l ) 's hostility to the "private" use or ownership of
expropriated property and hampered by section 4(H)(l )'s further
thirty-year restriction on private transfers?
A third set of issues is posed by uncertainties in the relationship
between the constitutional amendment and the continuing status of the
public purpose concept in Louisiana's other constitutional clauses. As

1 32 .

See Costonis, supra note 1 1 5 , at 403 nn.32-35. As this Article went to press,

Louisiana voters, on November 4, 2008, declined to rescind section 4(H) in a referendum
rejecting Act 936-SB No. 295 (Reg. Sess. 2008) setting forth the text of constitutional
amendment number 6. Were the same question posed following the November referendum,
opposition to this position can be anticipated on the grounds, first, that amendment number 6
effectively concedes that section 4(H)( l ) does apply to section 4(B)(2)( c) and, second, that the
voter's rejection of amendment number 6 conclusively establishes this outcome.

This

argument will fail, however, if Louisiana's appellate courts affirm the position of the trial
judge in New

Orleans

Redevelopment

applicable to section 4(B)(2)(c).
1 3 3.

Authonty

v.

Johnson that section 4(H)( l ) is not

See supra notes 1 06-109 and accompanying text.
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already noted, 134 six other Louisiana constitutional provisions employ
the term "public purpose"; each authorizes activities serving enhanced
economic development goals; and article VI, section 2 1 expressly
approves the expropriation and transfer to private parties o f industrial
property on the basis of its "economic impact." How, if at all, does
article I, section 4's closed-ended redefinition of "public purpose" and
the further exclusion of "economic

development" impact

these

provisions? 135
It is true that the difficulty of amending Louisiana's constitutional

provision affords a reasonable guarantee of its durability.

But the

state's courts may find themselves inclined to interpret the measure
cautiously, rather than robustly, precisely because of its l ongevity.
When a measure is open to as many conflicting interpretations as
Louisiana's measure, moreover, the outcome may only be durable

uncertainty.

Discussions with officials of ORM and NORA confirm

that these uncertainties have caused them to forego eminent domain
based redevelopment opportunities and have ignited an unresolved
debate on how clarification of their authority might be obtained. 136 In
the meantime New Orleans must simply muddle through, using its
eminent domain power fitfully while, as Nicolai Ouroussoff observes,
"three full years after Hurricane Katrina devastated New Orleans,
much of the city remains a wasteland."131
V.

CONCLUSION
This Article assesses Keio and the first wave of post-Keio

responses, including Louisiana's constitutional amendments, against
the backdrop of a hurricane-battered city's recovery needs. Its point of
See supra note I 09 and accompanying text.
Two examples from these clauses illustrate the interpretative challenge. First,
does article VT, section 2 1 's "economic impact" provision survive these amendments?
Section 4(8)( 1 ) excludes these expropriations from its ostensible ban on private transfers.

l 34.
1 35.

But section 4(H)( I ) does not exclude them from its crippling thirty-year lease or sale
restrictions. Does section 4(H)(I )'s failure to exempt industrial expropriations render them
subject to its restrictions?
Second, article I, section 4(8)(3) eliminates "economic
development" as a public purpose without exempting article VI, section 2 1 's industrial

property expropriatio ns from its scope. Does the subsequently enacted article
I, section
4(B)(3) override article VT, section 2 1 's approval of "economic impact" as a public
purpose?
1 36. Telephone Interview with Jolm J. Marshall, supra note 37; Telephone
Interview
with Ed Blakely, supra note 44. The option of pursuing the amendment
of article I, section
4(H)( J ) by rescinding the entirety of section 4(H), see supra note 1
3 2 and accompanying
text, met with the disagreement of those who feared that defeat of
amendment number 6
could be viewed by a court as a concession that section 4(H)( l
) does apply to section
4(B)(2)(c ) .
1 37.

Ouroussoff, supra note

I.
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departure and return is the clash between New Orleans ' recovery needs
and

the

urban

policies

underlying

an

interpretation

aligning

Louisiana's constitutional amendments with the anti-Keio format. This
Article's theme is that constitutional or policy reasoning that deprives
New Orleans of an indispensable recovery tool in the wake of the
nation's worst natural disaster affords the best evidence of its
inadequacy.

A.

Relinking Eminent Domain-Based Urban Renewal to Substantive
Redevelopment Goals
One of this Article's three principal conclusions is that the

Kela

court misconceived the issue before it by framing it as an economic
development "higher taxpayer" question.

In fact, the problems the

project was designed to address, like those identified in the UNOP
recovery program, engage not only "economic development" but a
broad

range

of

conventional

urban

planning

problems138

that

undeniably link the alleviation o f these problems to New London's
deployment of its eminent domain p ower.
A related issue should not be ignored although space limitations
only allow its introduction in this Article.

Rejuvenation of New

London's Fort Trumbull project area was also intended to create a
climate of confidence and citizen pride that would stimulate the
solution of

off-project physical and social planning issues associated

with crime, education, housing abandonment, and other planning ills.
May New London condemn property in the project area in part to
resolve planning problems occurring

elsewhere in the city if the project

area is uniquely and favorably situated to contribute to the problems'
resolution?' 39
Under the police power, imposing burdens on

an

"innocent"

parcel (and its owner) to solve a problem created by a separate
"problem" property risks invalidation on due process or fairness
grounds. But the eminent domain power allows expropriation as long
as some public use warrants a parcel 's acquisition, whether or not the

basis for the public use den"ves from a defect ofthe targetparcel itself
Would the vulnerability of New London's action under police power
principles lessen or disappear because the owner of the condemned
1 38. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
1 39. Bennan is not helpful, of course, because the boundaries of the area afflicted with
the planning problem-the Bennan project area's status as a slum-were coextensive with
the area within which the eminent domain power was exercised. See Berman v. Parker, 348
U.S. 26 (1954).
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property receives just compensation, an element that is lacking under
the police power?
B.

The Anti-KeIo Fo1111al" The TniJmph ofIdeology and Self
Selected Political Theory over Public Necessity and Urban
Planning Practice

This Article's second conclusion is that ideological or theoretical
preconceptions insensitive to the stubborn public necessities associated
with urban systems management are dubious sources for either
constitutional prescriptions or urban p lanning policies. Professor Ilya
Somin's various Keio essays, for example, are iron-willed in their
elevation of free markets over col lective decision making in the
redevelopment sphere and insistence that public officials who oversee
this process will be "captured" by a cabal of realtors, private
redevelopers, and others market actors. 14° From these two self-selected
propositions-each, not coincidentally, a staple of libertarian
theorizing and property rights ideology-he urges a categorical ban
not only on economically motivated projects but on true blight
condemnations as well. 141
Somin candidly acknowledges that his argument "is based
primarily on political and economic theory rather than on analysis of
the history and text of federal and state public use clauses."142 He
might have added that it likewise ignores urban planning theory and
practice, spheres that however marginally illuminated by his
ideologically driven theory, sternly resist colonization by it. His
theoretical reasoning carries an especially daunting burden of
persuasion because it would categorically bar New Orleans from
expropriating and transferring to active private use a single one of its
71,000 blighted properties, thereby shutting down the eminent domain
based elements of the UNOP recovery plan.143

1 40.
141.

See Somin, supm note 48, at 74; Sornin, supra note 7, at 1 83 .
See Somin, supm note 75, at 1 942-43.

1 42.
1 43.

Som.in, supra note 7, at 1 87-88.
Somin advocates unequivocally for constitutionally based, categorical bans not
only on what he describes as "economic development" takings, but for "true blight
condemnations." Somin, supra note 7, at 1 86. "[M]arket mechanisms can . . . accomplish the
goals of economic development takings without the need for eminent domain," he argues;
"[b ]y contrast, private sector elimination of blight may sometimes be stymied by collective

action problems requiring government intervention to overcome. My own view
is that a ban
on blight condemnations is probably desirable, even in spite of such concerns."
Somin, supra
note 75, at 1 942. This view reappears in SOJnin, supra note 7, at 27 1 .
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Somin fails to meet this burden. His argument's conclusions do
little more than channel its dogmatic premises-the private market's
superiority, even in the deeply hued collective action context of urban
redevelopment, and the inability of public officials to resist spec�al
interest capture. When Somin's unyielding and ill-informed disdain of
urban planning is piled atop these premises, his conclusions, of course,
are inevitable. 144 What is missing from his assessment is what this
Article has undertaken to provide: an evaluation of the consequences
of his abstractions in a real world context concretized in the Article by
New Orleans' recovery crisis.145
144. Operating at Somin's level of sweeping generalization, one might be inclined to
conclude with considerably greater confidence that the nation's current subprime mortgage
and credit crises not only display the private market's self-destructive myopia, venality, and,
perhaps, outright criminality, but have created the need for a massive infusion of public
resources underwritten and suffered by the collective citizenry. Observing Wall Street and
Detroit seeking-and obtaining-multibillion dollar subsidies, one winces at the irony of the
private marketeers ' quarter-century celebration of Ronald Reagan's aphorism that the words
"I am from the government, and I am here to help" are among the worst in the English
language. Views in opposition to eminent domain similar to Somin's are broadcast by the
Castle Coalition's publicists, albeit in a manner more fitting for Rush Limbaugh or Ann
Coulter than for credible scholars.
simplistically

and

repeatedly

For them, eminent domain-based redevelopment is

castigated

as

"eminent

unconstitutional invasion of "private property rights."
passim.

domain

abuse"

and

as

the

See CASTLE COAL., supra note 11,

Whether or not these labels apply is the question to be answered by appropriate

empirical and legal analysis, of course, but neither issue is genuinely engaged by Castle
Coalition. The property rights "invasion" is simply assumed, as though constitutions-state
and federal-have not invariably spoken to government's eminent domain power, alongside
the police power, as an inherent limitation on private economic expectancies. The proffered
"evidence" of eminent domain's depredations featured in the Coalition's 50 State Report
Card, see supra note 11, is a selection of court cases and civic controversies in which public
officials allegedly misused the eminent domain power. One might have as easily written a
"50 State Report Card" that condemns zoning by cherry-picking similar instances of its
actual or alleged misuse. In either case, no sensible observer would claim that these land use
powers either are not vulnerable to abuse or have not been abused. Assuredly, however, few
exercises of public power-land use or otherwise-would be deemed unconstitutional or
impolitic solely on the basis of a "potential for abuse" test, as we are now rediscovering with
the federal goverrunent's recapitalization of the nation's private banking and credit system.
Although clearly significant, risk of abuse is only one factor that must be engaged alongside
other considerations including the actual incidence of abusive or beneficial uses of the
context power; the heft of the community interests being addressed; the social, political, or
economic consequences both of action and of inaction; and the political/electoral and judicial
processes' capacity to monitor and remedy potential abuses. Sweeping generalizations in an
area in which the nuance of specific facts and context necessarily impact assessment are, I
believe, treacherous. Their spurious coherence is more likely than not to have been purchased
by their derivation from prior ideological and dogmatically theoretical premises.

New

Orleans today, however, is where the rubber hits the road in Ke/o's aftermath-hence, my
decisions to formulate this Article as a case study and to resist sweeping generalizations that
imperil the city's ability to wage its uphill struggle against an increasingly frightening future.

145. When empirical investigation is essential to support Professor Somin's argument,
it is often cavalierly advanced, if attended to at all.

For example, Somin advances a key
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Absent such an assessment, it is unclear whether or not Somin
believes that the private market will itself resolve New Orleans'
recovery challenge. If he does, his private market bias has apparently
blinded him to the reality that the market has been shunning entire
New Orleans neighborhoods since Katrina hit while awaiting effective
governmental leadership in line with UNOP's prescriptions. I suspect
it more likely that Somin does not think markets will solve the
problem, but would rather allow the problem and its evident human
and social costs to fester than violate his ideological and supporting
theoretical constructs. '46
argument in support of his call for a categorical ban on blight condemnation in the following
terms:
[T]he fact that some centralized coercion may be desirable does not mean that the
use of condemnation is the proper solution to the problem.

Local governments

have numerous other tools to deal with these sorts of problems,

including the

application of nuisance law, enforcement of housing codes, and the use of tax
abatements or subsidies to encourage improvement of property.
Somin, supra note 7, at 270. Characteristic of the similar absence of supporting investigation
for other components of his argument, Somin advises that "[a] complete evaluation of these
alternatives is beyond the scope of this Article." Id In fact, his article provides no empirical
investigation or evaluation of these techniques.

Thoughtful observers

of the urban

development process who have examined the question empirically as it bears upon nuisance
law and the enforcement of housing codes offe r a distinctly pessimistic a c count of the
effectiveness of both in the New Orleans context

and,

by implication, in other American

cities. See Alexander, supra note 27, at 732-33, 739-43, 758; Marcello, supra note 4 1, at 76768, 795-80 1.
146.

Unpersuasively,

Somin

seeks

to

justify

his

advocacy

for

a

categorical

constitutional ban on the ground that "even in areas where there is 'rea l ' blight-perhaps
especially there-the condemnation process is likely to be abused for the benefit of private
interests at the expense of the poor and politically weak." Somin, supra note 7, at 27 1 . That
reasoning as well as his principal sources and the case studies to which they refer, see id. at
268 n. 143, address eminent domain usage and practices a half-century or more out of date.
As to the present paper's case study, perhaps Somin i s unaware that New Orleans, like a large
number of America's other cities suffering urban distress, has been governed by African
American administrations for several decades now.

For the failure of the Keio bench and

anti-Keio academics like Somin to appreciate eminent domain's profound transformation
over the last half century, see Marc B. Mihaly, Living in

the Past: The Keio

Court andPublic

Private Economic Development, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 , 3 - 14 (2007). A more histrionic version
of Somin's position appears in testimony offered on behalf of Louisiana's anti-Kela measure
by Peppi Bruneau, one of its two principal co-sponsors who also served as its floor manager
in the Louisiana House.

Mr. Bruneau condemned those who opposed

the Louisiana

measures as unsupportive of New Orleans' recovery needs and as "vultures" who must be
prevented "from profiting from the misery of our citizens."

Broadcasts of the House of

Representatives Floor Day 32, at 3:39 (May 2 3 , 2006), http://houselouisiana.gov/H_
Video/2006/May2006.htm (select "House Floor Day 32" under "May 23, 2006") (testimony
of Rep. Peppi Bruneau).

Eminent domain for any purpose-highway construction,

redevelopment or otherwise--transforms government into "Big Brother sitting on top of you,
eager to grind you into the dust." Id at 3: 1 9 .

Despite his election from a Katrina-ravaged

New Orleans legislative district, Mr. Bruneau asserted that recovery-based transfers of
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Somin 's disappointment that many more states did not adopt
post-Keio measures patterned on the anti-Keio format is acute.141
Compelled by ideology and theory to explain this outcome, he
advances a two-part response. First, recalcitrant legislators refused the
anti-Keio format because they are subject to "capture" or perhaps were
captured by the foregoing real estate cabal, and hence are unable or
unwilling to do their constituents ' bidding.148

Second, the latter are

riven by "widespread political ignorance."149
Somin's

lead

claim

assumes

that eminent

domain-based

redevelopment will almost surely be a feckless, if not pernicious,
enterprise. This Article disagrees and offers a case study that suggests
that legislators who disagree with Somin-as the overwhelming
majority have done in refusing to enact post-Keio measures aligned
with the anti-Keio format-may perhaps have a better appreciation
than Somin of the marketplace's limitations and of the benefits of
public-private partnerships as stimulants to foundering neighborhoods
and cities. Following Katrina and its destruction of their state's coastal
areas, for example, Mississippi legislators rejected the categorical bans
so dear to Somin (and perhaps to Louisiana legislators) in order not to
impede their state's options in fashioning an effe ctive recovery
program. Should we conclude, as Somin's logic dictates, that they are
less virtuous than their Louisiana counterparts?

C

The Future ofthe Anti-Kelo Format· Whither Louisiana and

Fionaa
My final observation is that we are only at the beginning-not
the end-Qf the post-Keio story.

The structural and interpretative

issues detailed in this Article reappear throughout the post-Keio
measures o f many other states.

Interest groups from all sides of the

question will undoubtedly litigate aggressively to s ecure favored
outcomes. State judges, many of whom once served as local officials,
will

be

prepared

to

assume

the

demanding

interpretative

responsibilities that the measures ' often vague or conflicting texts
tmpose.

expropriated blighted property in a city suffering 71 ,000 blighted properties is an
"abomination."
See Archived Broadcasts of the House of Representatives Civil Law
Committee Meeting 1 :09 (Mar. 2 1 , 2006), http://house.Jouisiana.gov/H_Video/2006/
Mar2006.htm (select "Civil Law" under "March 2 1 , 2006").
1 4 7. Sornin, supra note 48, at 4.
148. Somin, supm note 7, at 1 84, 245.
1 49. Somin, supnmote 48, at 4.
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The question of greatest future interest to myself and perhaps to
anti-Keio proponents as well is how the anti-Keio format will fare for
those states that appear to have adopted it. Will Louisiana's highest
court, for example, bail New Orleans out by a reading decidedly
sympathetic to the city despite the 2006 constitutional amendments '
facially harsh anti-eminent domain language? Or will the court shut
down eminent domain-based redevelopment altogether, leaving it to
the Louisiana Legislature to reenter the picture if it so chooses?
Florida's future course may prove even more intriguing. Florida
will experience fierce tension between its nuclear eminent domain
ban150 and its exposure to trends that could set the stage for eminent
domain's more frequent use in this century. Recurrent Katrina-scale
natural disasters are predicted to accompany planetary global warming
and sea rise. Florida, which has already experienced many of the
nation's most severe hurricanes, features one of the nation's largest
riparian populations and a land mass particularly vulnerable to violent
Gulf weather. The subprime mortgage and credit crisis now upon the
nation will roil land markets and destabilize residential neighborhoods
for years. From the early twentieth century forward, Florida has
experienced legendary real estate booms and busts, and its real estate
markets are now among the nation's most distressed. Energy shortages
and attendant price increases will increase already strong pressure to
reverse the patterns of suburban and exurban sprawl found throughout
Florida's automobile-bound culture.
Recent immigration levels in Florida and other gateway states
rival those experienced nationwide during the 1 8 75- 1 9 1 5 era, which
largely reshaped America's cities over the next half-century.
Significant challenges will be associated with the nation's effort to
reverse environmental overloading and contamination of its urban,
maritime land-based systems. The Everglades' ruination only begins
to suggest the range of Florida's land and water pollution and its
pending water shortages. Finally, Florida claims fourteen of the
nation's 1 50 largest Metropolitan Statistical Areas, a number of which
are among the nation's fastest growing regions. Cities within this
group �uch as Jacksonville, Tampa, and Miami will not only have to
deal with the urban reshaping consequences of the foregoing trends
but the more familiar redevelopment challenges of the current era.

1 50.

Its constitutional provision permits the Florida legislature

"general law."

See supra notes 78-80, 83-86 and accompanying text.

to waive the ban by
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In Louisiana, Florida, and other apparently strong anti-Keio
states, ideology and academic theory will be forced to contend with
the practical, social and ethical demands of urban systems
management that are largely ignored by Somin and others who agree
with him. These states truly are the "laboratories" of which Justice
Brandeis spoke, and their "novel social and economic experiments"
will instruct us all.
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APPENDIX
LOUISIANA CONSTITUTION Article I, Section 4 (2008)

§ 4. Right to Property
Section 4.
(A) Every person has the right to acquire, own, control, use, enjoy,
protect, and dispose of private p roperty. This right is subject to
reasonable statutory restrictions and the reasonable exercise of the
police power.
Q3Xl) Property shall not be taken or damaged by the state or its pol itical
subdivisions except for public purposes and with just compensation
paid to the owner or into court for his benefit. Except a s specifically
authorized by Article VI, Section 2 1 of this Constitution property shall
not be taken or damaged by the state or its political subdivisions: (a)
for predominant use by any private person or entity; or (b) for transfer
of ownership to any private person or entity.
(2) As used in Subparagraph ( 1) o f this Paragraph and in Article VI,
Section 23 of this Constitution, "public purpose" shall be limited
to the following:
(a) A general public right to a definite use of the property.
(b) Continuous public ownership of property dedicated to one or
more of the following objectives and uses:
(i)

Public buildings in which publicly funded services are
administered, rendered, or provided.
(ii) Roads, bridges, waterways, access to public waters and
lands, and other public transportation, access, and
navigational systems available to the general public.
(iii) Drainage, flood control, levees, coastal and
navigational protection and reclamation for the benefit
of the public generally.
(iv) Parks, convention centers, museums, historical
buildings and recreational facilities generally open to
the public.
(v) Public utilities for the benefit of the public generally.
(vi) Public ports and public airports to facilitate the
transport of goods or persons in domestic or
international commerce.
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( c) The removal of a threat to public health or safety caused by
the existing use or disuse of the property.
(3) Neither economic development, enhancement of tax revenue, or
any incidental benefit to the public shall be considered in
determining whether the taking or damaging of property is for a
public purpose pursuant to Subparagraph (1) of this Paragraph or
Article VI, Section 23 of this Constitution.
(4) Property shall not be taken or damaged by any private entity
authorized by law to expropriate, except for a public and
necessary purpose and with just compensation paid to the owner;
in such proceedings, whether the purpose is public and necessary
shall be a judicial question.
( 5) In every expropriation or action to take property pursuant to the
provisions of this Section, a party has the right to trial by jury to
determine whether the compensation is just, and the owner shall
be compensated to the full extent of his loss. Except as otherwise
provided in this Constitution, the full extent o f loss shall include,
but not be limited to, the appraised value of the property and all
costs of relocation, inconvenience, and any other damages
actually incurred by the owner because of the expropriation.
(6) No business enterprise or any of its assets shall be taken for the
purpose of operating that enterprise or halting competition with a
government enterprise. However, a municipality may expropriate
a utility within its jurisdiction.
(C) Personal effects, other than contraband, shall never be taken.
(D) The following property may be forfeited and disposed of in a
civil proceeding, as provided by law: contraband drugs; property
derived in whole or in part from contraband drugs; property used
in the distribution, transfer, sale, felony possession, manufacture,
or transportation of contraband drugs; property furnished or
intended to be furnished in exchange for contraband drugs;
property used or intended to be used to facilitate any of the above
conduct; or other property because the above-described property
has been rendered unavailable.
(E) This Section shall not apply to appropriation of property
necessary for levee and levee drainage purposes.
(F) Further, the legislature may place limitations on the extent of
recovery for the taking of, or loss or damage to, property rights
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affected by coastal wetlands conservation, management,
preservation, enhancement, creation, or restoration activities.
(G) Compensation paid for the taking of, or loss or damage to,
property rights for the construction, enlargement, improvement,
or modification of federal or non-federal hurricane protection
projects, including mitigation related thereto, shall not exceed the
compensation required by the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States of America. However, this
Paragraph shall not apply to compensation paid for a building or
structure that was destroyed or damaged by an event for which a
presidential declaration of major disaster or emergency was
issued, if the taking occurs within three years of such event. The
legislature by law may provide procedures and definitions for the
provisions of this Paragraph.
(HXl) Except for leases or operation agreements for port facilities,
highways, qualified transportation facilities or airports, the state
or its political subdivisions shall not sell or lease property which
has been expropriated and held for not more than thirty years
without first offering the property to the original owner or his
heir, or, if there is no heir, to the successor in title to the owner at
the time of expropriation at the current fair market value, after
which the property can only be transferred by competitive bid
open to the general public. After thirty years have passed from the
date the property was expropriated, the state or political
subdivision may sell or otherwise transfer the property as
provided by law.
(2) Within one year after the completion of the project for which the
property was expropriated, the state or its political subdivision
which expropriated the property shall identify all property which
is not necessary for the public purpose of the proj ect and declare
the property as surplus property.
(3) All expropriated property identified as surplus property shall be
offered for sale to the original owner or his heir, or, if there is no
heir, to the successor in title to the owner at the time of
expropriation at the current fair market value, within two years
after completion of the project. If the original owner, heir, or
other successor in title refuses or fails to purchase the surplus
property within three years from completion of the project, then
the surplus property may be offered for sale to the general public
by competitive bid.

2008]
(4)

AMERICAN CITIES IN POST-KELO ERA

4 37

After one year from the completion of the project for which
property was expropriated, the original owner or his heir, or, if
there is no heir, the successor in title to the owner at the time of
expropriation may petition the state or its political subdivision
which expropriated the property to have all or any portion of his
property declared surplus. If the state or its political subdivision
refuses or fails to identify all or any portion of the expropriated
property as surplus, the original owner or the successor in title
may petition any court of competent jurisdiction to have the
property declared surplus.

Amended by Acts 1989, No. 840, §1, approved Oct 7, 1989, eff. Nov.
7, 1989; A cts 2003, No. 1295, §1, approved Oct 4, 2003, eff. Nov. 6,
2003; Acts 2003, No. 1304, §1, approved Oct 4, 2003, eff. Nov. 6,
2003; Acts 2006, No. 851, §1, approved Sept 30, 2006, eff. Oct 31,
2006; Acts 2006, No. 853, §1, approved Sept JO, 2006, eff. Oct 31,
2006; Acts 2006, No. 859, §1, approved Sept 30, 2006, eff. Oct 31,
2006.

